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SUPPLY REGULATION AT RUSSIAN REGIONAL FOOD MARKETS2
The national system of regulation of the agro-industrial complex (AIC) and the
food market is realized on two levels through a combination of decisions taken by the
federal  and  regional  authorities.  At  the present time  the system  is  at the stage of
formation: the regional authorities are beginning to play a more important role in the
agrarian policy, the employed economic support mechanisms are being adjusted to the
realities of the Russian economy. On the other hand  the clash of  objectives  of  the
federal and regional development still remains, and the powers of the center and regions
are not clearly differentiated yet.     
Among the shortcomings the systems intended to support AIC on the regional
level demonstrate at the present stage of development are the following:
-  Mostly  fulfilled  through  regional  food  funds,  the  distribution  of
budget resources has turned in many regions into  local  price adjustment
instruments. This runs counter to the principles of a market economy and in
no way facilitates the growth of production. As a result of this practice the
differences in the commodity producers’ financial position  are becoming
greater making the need of financial resources even more pressing –  the
reverse of what was expected.
-  Direct subsidies granted to local producers are often accompanied by
import  restricting  measures.  This  destroys  the  unity  of  the  all-Russian
market and facilitates the emergence of lowly competitive local markets.
-  The amounts of allocated finance  strongly  depend on  the current
state of  the regional  budget. Furthermore,  the intention  to  offer  AIC  a
priority support often remains a mere declaration.
The  regulation  mechanism  comprises  a  whole  set  of  various  instruments
designed to influence the commodity producers by  using  which  the government  is
attempting to stop the recession in the agricultural sector and stabilize the situation at the
food market. Along with the overall decrease in the amounts of support changes are
observed in the balance between the types of support (direct or indirect, revocable or
irrevocable and other).
Credit  relations  and  especially  seasonal  crediting  are  the  most  effective
instrument to be applied to stabilize the agricultural production.
Beginning from 1992 the centralized soft agricultural credit was  a  necessary
condition for both  agricultural  enterprises and  independent  farmers  to  maintain the
production. This kind of credit was called «soft» because of the preferential interest3
rates (28% for agricultural enterprises and 8% for individual farmers)  and  payment
periods  it  offered.  However,  the  distribution  and  spending  of  those  huge  credit
resources were inadequately controlled, and the funds were sometimes used for non-
agricultural purposes or even sold to organizations outside of the agricultural sector.
Preferential interest rates were no longer subsidized starting from 1994, and since that
time credits were offered at the interest rate that was equal to the current discount rate
fixed by the Central Bank of Russia. In the spring of 1995 that crediting practice was
replaced  with  commodity  crediting  implemented  in  accordance  with  the  scheme
proposed by the Russian Ministry of Finance. In fact that was a non-interest bearing
kind of crediting from the federal budget revenue. However, in 1997 commodity credits
became no longer available since it was found out that that practice could lead to an
uncontrolled increase in budget expenditures. It should  be  mentioned that in  reality
commodity credits were not that non-interest bearing because the borrowers had to pay
to the oil companies who would considerably hold up the prices for their products sold
under commodity credit agreements.
Soft agricultural credit was revived this year on a principally new basis. The
difference is that now the resources are strictly appropriated for seasonal, but not capital
purposes. Another new feature is that the interest is flexible, constituting _ of the current
Central  Bank  discount  rate,  and  does  not  vary  by  farm  patterns.  Eventually  the
effectiveness  of  crediting  depends  on  the rate of  repayment,  the  Agroprombank’s
property accountability and on the sufficiency of  credit  resources  extended  on  easy
terms as well. In 1997 the special credit funds were planned to amount  2,8  trillion
rubles of budget resources and 9 trillion rubles of repayments on commodity credits
extended in 1995-1996. However, the volume of crediting was actually lower because
not all of the regions could repay, although their debts were redrafted into securities to
be sold at the open market. The average credit allotted from the federal budget that year
amounted 88 million rubles per agricultural enterprise operating on 4 thousand ha of
arable land and 660 thousand rubles per peasant farm with 30 ha of arable land. As the
authorized bank, SBS-Agro used its own method of crediting, taking into account the
financial position of the borrower and preferring to support sustainable farms alone.  
The imperfection of the new  model  soon  revealed  itself:  the credit  capacity
requirements appeared to be too strict for the majority of producers. As a result, most
of the producers never did succeed in obtaining the necessary funds and had to apply
for over-priced commodity credits. For instance, only 60 of 260 profitable farms in the
Saratov Oblast  were  finally  granted credits on  easy  terms.  In  this  situation  local4
authorities  in  many  regions  had  to  borrow  from  commercial banks  on  their  own
security. Thus, it is evident that the present system of distribution of soft state credits
among regions and individual farms has to be revised to ensure reasonable availability
of resources. In conditions of price disparity the credit capacity of a farm should mainly
be judged by the rate of increase in the overall sales, not by the profitability rate.
Another difficulty is that farms do not have enough property that could serve as
a pledge. In view of this special attention must  be  paid to  the development of  the
securities market allowing for the circulation of warehouse receipts and grain warrants.
An essential task today is also the development of mortgage lending.
The on-going decrease in the volume of irrevocable support provided from the
federal budget led to a sharp reduction of the proportion of such support in the total of
projected budget expenditures on agriculture. As a result, irrevocable subsidies became
only sufficient to cover 30% of expenses on fuel, energy, gas and mineral fertilizers.
However, like in the case with credits, the actually granted support by  far  failed  to
match with the planned level. For instance, in 1996 not a single ruble was allotted in
compensation for the above expenses: by way  of  budget support  the regions  were
offered grain purchased by the federal fund at overestimated price of 1,5 million rubles
per ton. The situation was quite similar in 1997.
Much was said about  the ineffectiveness  of  the current support  distribution
mechanism.  It  is  generally  recognized  and  proved  by  the  world  experience  that
stimulation of  consumer  demand  and  regulation  of  consumer’s  income  are  more
effective  at the intermediate  stage than  subsidizing  food  production.  Nevertheless,
abandonment  of  a  number  of  compensation  measures  and  direct  payments  to
agricultural  producers  is  impossible  today.  Support  at  other  reproduction  stages
(subsidies to agricultural implements manufacturers  or  food  processing  companies)
will not affect the profitability of agricultural production proper. In these conditions the
government regulation system must be reformed gradually.
Weak coordination between the federal and local markets is often a source of
regional crises (especially in the case with the regions with specialized agriculture) and
instability  in  production and  food  supply.  The  reaction  of  the  regions  to  market
transformations is different.
The regions-main food producers initially oriented towards the Russian market
suffered the most, the principal causes of that being, first, the lack of a real market
environment and, second, the inequality among the agricultural producers – a result of
the local nature of support provided by the regional authorities.5
The proportion of budget subsidies in the cost of the gross agricultural produce
varies from  3%  to  18-21%  depending on  the region.  At  the  same  time  regional
agricultural  development programs  are rather aimed  to  slow  down  the process  of
economic stratification and preserve the present alignment of positions by means of
«fair» distribution of technical and financial resources, debt charge-off, conclusion of
agreements on deliveries to regional food funds and etc. Subsidies and compensations
granted via local budgets are considered a  means  to  reduce the losses  and  prevent
further production recession and in no way encourage the effective use of the regional
natural and economic potential and rational specialization.
The amounts of subsidies vary by region from 0% to 94% of the purchase price
for cattle and poultry and from 0% to 78% of that for milk. The regional purchase price
differences (with account of the subsidies included in the price) are even greater.
The amounts of subsidies for meat and dairy products are the biggest in the
regions with specialized agriculture (Kalmikia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Orenburg
Oblast) in which the production costs and, accordingly, the purchase prices are lower
and  also  in  the regions  producing insignificant  quantities  of  food  by  using  costly
methods. Thus, the meat production cost is relatively low in Kalmikia, Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan (80.6%, 73.6% and 73.2% of the average Russian cost, respectively) and
is the highest in Karelia, Komi and the Khabarovsk District (294%, 295% and 392%,
respectively). This consequence of the different budget policies implemented  by  the
local authorities can hardly be economically justified.
In the regions with the highest rate of agricultural specialization the volume of
subsidizing is not always sufficient (Kalmikia, Bashkortostan and the Omsk Oblast are
the exceptions).
The strongest price support is extended in the republics enjoying privileges in
terms of independence  of  their budgets,  while the regions  in  which  the supported
branches are the branches of agricultural specialization provide the  least of  support.
Price support from the national and regional budgets is strictly controlled in EU where
the national price levels are being gradually converged. It seems reasonable that  the
groundless purchase price differences in Russia be eliminated by means of guaranteed
prices formally introduced in 1995 but never financed due to budget shortages.
The amounts allotted in support of AIC from the regional budgets much depend
on the budget provision. In a significant part of agricultural regions (like the Krasnodar
District, the Tambov, Volgograd, Astrakhan, Saratov and other Oblasts)  the budget
provision is poor. At the same time the contribution of these regions to the  federal6
budget is often incomparably more substantial than the amounts they receive back from
the center. This brings about the necessity to improve the  inter-budget  relations  the
current function of which is to equalize but not to stimulate. The application  of  the
differentiated  approach to  the distribution  of  budget funds  sometimes  leads to  the
situation when the average per capita income in the regions receiving transfers from the
federal budget turns out to be higher than the average Russian per capita budget income
and even higher than that in the regions receiving no transfers. The share of federal
support a region can expect to be granted is currently determined based on the average
per capita budget income in this region. This practice encourages the regions to remain
dependent on the center and gives no incentives for them to increase the local budget
revenues. Moreover,  the uniform  approach to  the formation  of  the federal  budget
revenues not allowing for the weak tax potential of agricultural regions leads to  the
emergence of considerable reciprocal financial flows at the stage of allocation of support
to regional AICs. For instance, in 1997 the Saratov Oblast was  provided with  300
billion rubles in support of the sowing campaign. However, the term of actual receipt of
the funds occurred to be longer than the period of sowing. The resulting temporal lag in
the movement of resources from the region to the federal budget and then back gives
the banking system a good opportunity to advantageously use the budget resources as
credit funds.
We believe agricultural regions should be given the right to use some of the tax
sources currently exploited by the federal center. First and foremost this regards the
value-added tax received from  the sales  of  the agricultural  goods  produced on  the
territory  of  the region. The resulting finance  should  be  used  to  form  a  territorial
agricultural producers support reserve that in turn should have a direct relation to the
agricultural specialization of the region.
On the one hand, switching to regional support systems enables to take a more
detailed account of the local demand and supply peculiarities but, on the other hand, it
produces a certain negative effect by hampering the development of the common all-
Russian food market. Dependent on the budget resources and specific features of  a
particular  region, the rates of  subsidies  and  compensations  are  a  cause  of  many
difficulties in the inter-regional economic relations. The analysis shows that such rates
to a large extent depend on the factors that have nothing in common with agricultural
production proper. The amounts actually paid out from the local budgets vary greatly by
region.7
To  our  opinion, availability  of  government  support  should  depend  on  the
production effectiveness demonstrated by the claimant. This principle is currently used
in the Saratov Oblast AIC regulation concept: the volume of support is determined by
employing a standard index that is based on the production level.  The above index
compares the actually achieved results with the potential rate of production.
A very important aspect is the effective utilization by the agricultural producers
of the subsidies and compensations. The subsidies for the products of cattle breeding
paid out from the local budgets are usually distributed based on the principle of equality
or the priority is given to the most needy for the time being, irrespective of the results of
the farms. However, in a number of regions cattle breeders have to work hard to obtain
a substantial subsidy even now. For instance, farmers in the Perm Oblast are granted no
subsidies at all if they produce less than 2300 liters of milk per cow. In case this rate of
production is achieved or passed, the amounts of subsidies vary depending on the actual
such rate. On the federal level the agricultural producers have been classified into 3
groups according to their financial position.
The regional agricultural policy of the federal authorities should not imply all the
problems to be shifted to the regions. Without government support, direct and indirect
subsidies the agricultural sectors of many Russian regions have no future.
A burning task of today is the revision of the taxation system which should not
only be used as a fiscal instrument, but should also be applied for the purposes  of
stimulation and  re-distribution.  Currently the agricultural  commodity  producers  are
obliged to pay 12 different taxes, not including the local ones. For the food processing
companies the number of taxes payable is 40. Until the Tax Code is adopted, the tax
legislation comprises more than 900 instruments. The difficulty in the exercise of the
right for the privileges the above legislation offers is another problem.  The practice
shows  that both  the independent  farmers  and  the agricultural  companies  are often
unaware  of  the  existence  of  such  privileges  or  have  for  this  or  that  reason  no
opportunity to  enjoy them.  Meanwhile the tax privileges  given  to  the  agricultural
commodity producers are impressive: the latter are exempted from the profit tax and the
property tax, they enjoy lower rates of deductions to non-budget funds and a value-
added tax rate that is two times lower for a number of prodoffers is another problem.
The practice shows that both the independent farmers and the agricultural companies are
often unaware of the existence of such privileges or have for this or that reason no
opportunity to  enjoy them.  Meanwhile the tax privileges  given  to  the  agricultural
commodity producers are impressive: the latter are exempted from the profit tax and the8
property tax, they enjoy lower rates of deductions to non-budget funds and a value-
added tax rate that is two times lower for a number of prodoffers is another problem.
The practice shows that both the independent farmers and the agricultural companies are
often unaware of the existence of such privileges or have for this or that reason no
opportunity to  enjoy them.  Meanwhile the tax privileges  given  to  the  agricultural
commodity producers are impressive: the latter are exempted from the profit tax and the
property tax, they enjoy lower rates of deductions to non-budget funds and a value-
added tax rate taterial. As a result, the described strategy becomes not so advantageous,
since  the  small-scale  processing  is  usually  connected  with  significant  costs.
Consequently, this cannot be considered an appropriate way to improve the agricultural
producers’ financial position. As the government support to the agricultural sector is
insufficient, the farmers must be given legal opportunities to increase the production
and relief from the tax burden.
Not  the  agriculture  alone  is  in  need  of  government  support.  Many  other
branches of the agricultural and industrial complex, such as the branches producing the
means of agricultural production and the branches that complete the production cycle,
are in the position that is no better. If the regional authorities understand the situation
then it may lead to the adoption of a privileged taxation system and the exemption from
the local taxes of the industrial companies of AIC that deliver their products to farmers
to the account of the oblast order. Such practice is applied in the Altai District, and the
advantages of privileged taxation are being discussed in Saratov. Privileged taxation is
also applied to wholesale food markets in many Russian regions.
The aim  of  the improvement  of  the taxation  system  is  not  limited  to  the
reduction of the tax burden the agricultural commodity producers have to shoulder but
is also the revision of the whole such system. For instance, the financial basis of the
local self-government system in the Belgorod Oblast is a uniform food tax which is a
substitute for the usual local taxes and which is payable by everyone who has arable
land and who is engaged in agricultural production. The average oblast food tax rate is
288 kg of grain or  the equivalent  amount  of  any  other product. The Oblast  Food
Corporation then turns the food resources collected in this manner into money the full
amount of which is retained by the Oblast. The survey by questionnaire shows that
many  agricultural  producers  approve this  kind  of  taxation  practice.  However,  the
positive experience of the Belgorod  Oblast can only be spread to where there is an
objective Land Cadastre. Only in this case  the introduction  of  the food  tax can be9
justified and fair since the food tax is calculated based on the fertility of the soil as the
principal means of agricultural production.
The obvious insufficiency  of  government  support  on  all levels is  gradually
getting off-set by the development of the processes of integration among the agricultural
producers and their cooperation with the representatives of the allied AIC  branches.
Farmers’  cooperatives  and  associations of  various  kinds  and  vertical  financial  and
industrial groups and corporations are now emerging in many Russian regions. The
steps in this direction should also be supported by the government and are to a certain
extent  supported  already  by  the  Enactment  of  the  Government  of  the  Russian
Federation «On the Economic Conditions of the Functioning of the  Agro-Industrial
Complex of the Russian Federation in 1997».
The analysis shows that at the present stage the national AIC regulation system
is characterized by greater economic independence of the regions in dealing with the
problems related to the agricultural and industrial complex. 70% of the total  budget
resources  allotted  to  AIC  are  granted  from  the  regional  budgets.  However,  the
consequences of this handing over of the responsibilities from the federal level to the
regional one can hardly be predicted now.                          